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INTRODUCTION
A. “Fixing” a Working System Can Only Break It
U.S. environmental regulations are under attack. The Trump Administration
is pushing for a more industry-driven environmental protection policy,1
asserting that it plans to “roll-back” long-standing, effective environmental
regulations to bring back more blue-collar jobs.2 Industry-forward
environmental policies like those favored by the current administration exist
worldwide, particularly in Germany.3 Although, in theory, broad promises to
bring back industrial jobs sound appealing; in practice, industry-driven
environmental regulation is largely ineffective. Rather, the current U.S.
environmental regulations for vehicle emissions are far more effective in both
fostering clear communication with regulated industries about what is expected
to better deter environmental harms as well as holding manufacturers
accountable if they violate these clear expectations.4
The drastic difference in these regulatory approaches is best illustrated by
both the United States’ and Germany’s responses to the Volkswagen (VW)
emissions-cheating scandal.5 In 2015, news emerged that VW installed “defeat
devices” in about eleven million light-duty diesel vehicles that they marketed as

1
Coral Davenport, Counseled by Industry, Not Staff, E.P.A. Chief Is Off to a Blazing Start, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/politics/trump-epa-chief-pruitt-regulations-climatechange.html?mcubz=0; Ryan Beene et al., Trump to Seek Repeal of California Smog-Fighting Power,
BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2018, 12:07 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-23/trump-is-saidto-seek-repeal-of-california-s-smog-fighting-power.
2
Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Remains Top Target with Trump Administration Proposing 31
Percent Budget Cut, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/
wp/2017/05/22/epa-remains-top-target-with-trump-administration-proposing-31-percent-budget-cut/?utm_
term=.69819f7032f8 (“Candidate Donald Trump vowed to get rid of the Environmental Protection Agency ‘in
almost every form,’ leaving only ‘little tidbits’ intact.”); see Id.also Scott Simon, Trump’s EPA Has Rolled Back
Dozens of Environmental Regulations, NPR (August 12, 2017, 7:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/12/
542998622/trump-s-epa-rolls-back-dozens-of-environmental-regulations (interviewing Gina McCarthy, former
U.S. EPA Administrator).
3
Alison Smale, In Germany, a Cozy Relationship Between Carmakers and Government, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/europe/germany-volkswagen-autos-merkel.html.
4
Bill Vlasic & Aaron M. Kessler, It Took E.P.A. Pressure to Get VW to Admit Fault, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/it-took-epa-pressure-to-get-vw-to-admit-fault.html;
Jack Ewing, In the U.S., VW Owners Get Cash. In Europe, They Get Plastic Tubes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/business/international/vw-volkswagen-europe-us-lawsuit-settlement.
html.
5
Peter Whoriskey et al., VW Emissions Cheating Affects 11 Million Cars Worldwide, WASH. POST (Sept.
22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/vw-emissions-cheating-affects-11-millioncars-worldwide/2015/09/22/30f59bca-6126-11e5-9757-e49273f05f65_story.html?utm_term=.9e8eca9f1038.
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“eco-diesel.”6 These devices temporarily limited the emissions of nitrous oxide
and other pollutants to be within threshold emissions limits when the vehicles
detected driving conditions of federal testing procedures, but then ceased to
work when those vehicles detected “real-world” driving conditions.7 In effect,
VW light-duty diesel vehicles worldwide emitted far more nitrous oxide than
threshold limits allowed.8
The aftermath of the VW emissions-cheating scandal reveals the serious
harms that result when a country is unable to enforce vehicle-emissions
regulations against worldwide manufacturers like VW—companies that have
harmed not only the environment, but also the public health of its citizens.9
Germany has been widely criticized for its lack of enforcement response to the
VW crisis.10 Although it has recently fined VW for the diesel scandal, it took
nearly three years and worldwide criticism before the country acted against the
manufacturer.11 In contrast, the United States entered consent decrees with VW
and instituted recalls and buy-backs of affected vehicles from consumers far
quicker.12 Many credit the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
strong enforcement approach with causing VW to admit both to cheating
6
Letter from Philip A. Brooks, Dir., Envt’l. Prot. Agency, to Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, and
Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/
vw-nov-caa-09-18-15.pdf (regarding notice of violation) [hereinafter Notice of Violation]; Whoriskey et al.,
supra note 6.
7
Guilbert Gates et al., How Volkswagen’s ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.
html?mcubz=0; see Moritz Contag et al., How They Did It: An Analysis of Emission Defeat Devices in Modern
Automobiles, 2017 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 231, 231 (2017), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/
7958580/?reload=true; see also Notice of Violation, supra note 7; Whoriskey et al., supra note 6.
8
Notice of Violation, supra note 7; Whoriskey et al., supra note 6.
9
For reporting on inability of individual owners of affected VW vehicles to receive remedy for harm
done in purchasing affected vehicles, see Ewing, supra note 5. For public health impacts of the VW emissions
cheating scandal, see Guillaume P. Chossiere et al., Public Health Impacts of Excess NOx Emissions from
Volkswagen Diesel Passenger Vehicles in Germany, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Mar. 3, 2017, at 1, 1.
10
Ewing, supra note 5; Jack Ewing, As German Election Looms, Politicians Face Voters’ Wrath for Ties
to Carmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/germany-dieselelection.html; Kevin Tarsa, Won’t Get Fooled Again: Why VW’s Emissions Deception Is Illegal in Europe and
How to Improve the EU’s Auto Regulatory System, 40 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 315, 342 (2017) (arguing
that Volkswagen’s use of defeat devices in light duty diesel vehicles also violates European environmental
regulations).
11
Charles Riley, Germany Fines Volkswagen $1.2 Billion Over Diesel Scandal, CNN MONEY (June 13,
2018, 1:11 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/13/investing/volkswagen-fine-germany/index.html.
12
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, United States v. Volkswagen AG, No. 16-CR-20394 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11,
2017); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in
Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees Are Indicted in Connection with
Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-agagrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and-civil-penalties-six [hereinafter Volkswagen Press
Release].

PIERCECOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19

622

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

6/5/2019 11:12 AM

[Vol. 33

emissions tests worldwide and to committing federal fraud and conspiracy.13
This led to the manufacturer paying nearly $26 billion,14 the largest fine an
automaker has seen to date.15
B. 38,000 Premature Deaths and Counting
Worldwide, diesel vehicles are emitting far more pollutants, like nitrous
dioxide (NOx), than their threshold limits allow.16 In 2014, the International
Council on Clean Transportation17 (ICCT) reported that light-duty diesel
vehicles emit far more NOx under real-world driving conditions than when those
same vehicles are tested under federal regulatory emissions tests.18 In May 2017,
a study published in Nature found that light-duty diesel vehicles in major
markets, such as the United States and Europe, produce over fifty percent more
NOx than official certification limits indicated.19
Selling vehicles that will emit far more NOx than legal limits allow is not
only breaking the law, but also damaging the natural environment and
contributing to widespread respiratory problems and even death.20 NOx reacts
in the atmosphere to form ozone (O3), which creates smog21 and combines with
13
Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 5; Jack Ewing, 10 Monkeys and a Beetle: Inside VW’s Campaign for
‘Clean Diesel’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/world/europe/volkswagendiesel-emissions-monkeys.html (“[There is] a global emissions scandal that has already forced Volkswagen to
plead guilty to federal fraud and conspiracy charges in the United States and to pay more than $26 billion in
fines.”).
14
Ewing, supra note 14.
15
Paul A. Eisenstein, Volkswagen Slapped with Largest Ever Fine for Automakers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 21,
2017,
12:33
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/judge-approves-largest-fine-u-s-historyvolkswagen-n749406.
16
See generally Susan Anenberg et al., Letter, Impacts and Mitigation of Excess Diesel-Related
Emissions in 11 Major Vehicle Markets, 545 NATURE 467, 468 (2017); Vicente Franco et al., Real World Exhaust
Emissions from Modern Diesel Cars: A Meta-Analysis of PEMS Emissions Data from EU (Euro 6) and U.S.
(TIER 2 BIN 5/ULEV II) Diesel Passenger Cars (ICCT White Paper, Oct. 2014).
17
The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) is an independent research group that
provides data to government entities that regulate the environment. Mission // History, INT’L COUNCIL CLEAN
TRANSP., https://www.theicct.org/mission-history (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
18
Franco et al., supra note 17.
19
Anenberg et al., supra note 17. The study examined markets representing over 80% of diesel sales in
2015. This included Australia, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea,
and the United States. Id. Press Release, Ray Minjares & Joe Schultz, Int’l Council on Clean Transp., New Study
Quantifies Global Health, Environmental Impacts of Nitrous Oxide Emissions from Diesel Vehicles (May 15,
2017), http://www.theicct.org/news/nature-impacts-diesel-nox-may2017.
20
United States’ Amended Complaint at 8, U.S. v. Volkswagen AG, No. 3:16-cv-00295 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
7, 2016) (No. 2009-03) [hereinafter United States’ Amended Complaint]; Chossiere et al., supra note 10;
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Why and How They Are Controlled, E.P.A. Technical Bulletin No. 456/F-99-006R
(1999); Anenberg et al., supra note 17.
21
United States’ Amended Complaint, supra note 21; Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Why and How They Are

PIERCECOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19

2019]

6/5/2019 11:12 AM

IF IT AIN’T BROKE

623

sulfur oxides and condensation to create acid rain.22 Excess NOx emissions were
attributed to approximately 38,000 premature deaths worldwide in 2015.23
Experts have estimated that the VW “eco-diesel” vehicle emissions in Germany
alone have caused a mortality impact of 1200 premature deaths since 2008.24
Additionally, the economic impact for the added healthcare costs to treat the
respiratory effects of excess NOx emissions throughout the European Union
(EU) is estimated to be nearly €1.9 billion.25 The same study determined that if
VW had reduced the emissions of its “eco-diesel” vehicles to the legal limits in
the EU by the end of 2017, nearly €4.1 billion in health costs could have been
saved.26
VW is not the only car company producing vehicles that have emitted far
higher than certification limits in real-world driving conditions. In May 2017,
the United States filed a complaint against Fiat Chrysler alleging the company
installed defeat devices to cheat on federal emissions test procedures in violation
of the Clean Air Act (CAA).27 Researchers believe it is likely that other diesel
manufacturers have cheated on emissions testing.28 If there is not an effective
regulatory system in place to hold future automakers accountable and keep
emissions within legal limits, the harms to public health and our environment
will only continue to grow.
C. An Argument for Continued Success in the United States
“Rolling back” the United States’ existing regulations for the emissions of
new light-duty diesel motor vehicles will result in a structure that is far too
Controlled, supra note 21.
22
United States’ Amended Complaint, supra note 21; Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Why and How They Are
Controlled, supra note 21.
23
Anenberg et al., supra note 17; Minjares & Schultz, supra note 20; see also Nitrogen Oxides (NOx),
Why and How They Are Controlled, supra note 21.
24
Chossiere et al., supra note 10, at 11.
25
Id. at 10. Based on the value of the Euro in 2015. Id.
26
Id. at 9. Based on the value of the Euro in 2015. Id.
27
Currently, the United States is in an enforcement proceeding with Fiat Chrysler. Press Release, Dep’t
of Justice, United States Files Complaint Against Fiat Chrysler Automobiles for Alleged Clean Air Act
Violations (May 23, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-complaint-against-fiat-chryslerautomobiles-alleged-clean-air-act [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
28
Press Release, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Study: Volkswagen’s Excess Emissions Will Lead to 1,200
Premature Deaths in Europe (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-03/miotsve030217.php. Steven Barrett, a co-author for a recently published study on Volkswagen diesel emissions,
warned that “it seems unlikely that Volkswagen is the only company with issues with excess emissions . . . . We
don’t know if other manufacturers have these defeat devices, but there is already evidence that many other
vehicles in practice emit more than the applicable test-stand limit value. So we’re trying to do this for all diesel
vehicles.” Id.
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flexible to support any strong enforcement response against potential future
violators. By comparing the U.S. and Germany’s separate responses to the VW
emissions cheating scandal, this Comment demonstrates the serious potential
harm of eliminating existing U.S. regulations to be more flexible and thus more
amenable to industry. Currently, the EPA is strong enough not only to hold
violators responsible, but also to deter other automakers from following in VW’s
footsteps. Meanwhile, Germany’s regulatory body for vehicle emissions, the
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA), lacks enough leverage to keep its own
manufacturer in line and enforce emissions standards for the vehicles it
approves.
While this Comment argues that the United States has a far stronger
approach to regulating emissions from light-duty diesel vehicles than Germany,
the U.S. approach is not perfect. Because emissions test parameters are public
knowledge,29 automakers can design their emissions control devices “to the
test.”30 For example, the VW “eco-diesel“ family of vehicles had a software
device that controlled emissions to the legal limits for the first thirty minutes that
the vehicle ran but then gradually stopped working as the engine continued to
run.31 This is likely because the federal emissions testing procedure used in the
United States is approximately twenty minutes long, thus providing an
opportunity for VW to evade notice of its practices for seven years.32
Additionally, compliance assurance testing of emissions from vehicles that
have been approved by EPA may be improved using Portable Emissions
Measurement Systems (PEMS).33 PEMS are devices placed on the tailpipes of
vehicles to monitoring the real-time emissions from the vehicle in everyday
driving.34 These systems can gather a large amount of data on a wide variety of
vehicles to analyze any overall discrepancies in the emissions that vehicles may
have.35 A federal PEMS program may have the potential to gather even more
data and aid in discovering potential emissions issues nationwide.

29

Control of Air Pollution from Mobile Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 86.127-00 (1977).
Contag et al., supra note 8, at 1.
31
Id.
32
Control of Air Pollution from Mobile Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 86 App. I (1977).
33
PEMS (Portable Emissions Measurement System), Science Inventory Library, EPA.GOV,
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_Report.cfm?dirEntryId=72469 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
34
Marina Kousoulidou et al., Use of Portable Emissions Measurement Systems (PEMS) for the
Development and Validation of Passenger Car Emission Factors, 64 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 329, 329 (2013).
35
See generally Id. Some states, like Colorado, began testing out PEMS on their roads to determine if a
wide-spread system will be possible. See, e.g., Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & the Env’t, Final Draft, Guidelines
for State-Only Required Continuous Monitoring Systems in the State of Colorado (2005) at 13,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/AP_Continuous-Monitoring-System-Guidelines.pdf.
30
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Before improvements like PEMS can be entertained, the current vehicle
emissions regulations must remain in place. There cannot be any progress in this
area of regulatory and administrative law if the United States reverts to a system
like that of Germany’s in which there is effectively no emissions regulation of
automakers. In a time of “regulatory backlash,” and attempts by the Trump
Administration to “roll-back” environmental regulations,36 this Comment will
focus on the benefits of preserving the regulatory system that is in place today.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the VW emissions
cheating scandal in detail—how the automaker fooled regulatory agencies
world-wide to cheat emissions tests and both the United States’ and Germany’s
widely different responses. Part II explores the development of vehicle emission
regulation in both countries and the major differences in their regulatory systems
and highlights the tools that the United States has at its disposal. Part III then
argues that Germany’s regulatory structure is ineffective because it must
compete with other European countries for automaker business. Because the
United States is not similarly situated, it should not compromise its strong
vehicle emission regulatory structure. This could risk the loss of those regulatory
tools that helped it hold VW accountable for harming the environment and
public health. This Comment concludes that it is in the United States’ best
interest not to “roll-back” regulations that have proven effective over more
flexible approaches.
I.

“A CAMPAIGN OF TRICKERY”: THE VW EMISSIONS CHEATING SCANDAL

The discrepancy between the emissions of new motor vehicles in federal
testing and emissions in real-world driving entered the public awareness with
the revelation of VW’s “Dieselgate” scandal in 2015—VW’s “campaign of
trickery.”37 VW admitted to violating the Clean Air Act (CAA) by installing
devices in approximately eleven million light-duty diesel vehicles world-wide.38
These devices detected when the vehicles were undergoing emissions tests or
experiencing conditions like those in emissions tests.39 During certification test
cycles the devices would control emissions but stopped working under real-

36
Davenport, supra note 2; Dennis & Eilperin, supra note 3 (“Candidate Donald Trump vowed to get rid
of the Environmental Protection Agency ‘in almost every form,’ leaving only ‘little tidbits’ intact.”); see also
Simon, supra note 3.
37
Jack Ewing, Inside VW’s Campaign of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/06/business/inside-vws-campaign-of-trickery.html; Whoriskey et al., supra note 6.
38
Gates et al., supra note 8.
39
Notice of Violation, supra note 7; Whoriskey et al., supra note 6.
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world driving conditions.40 While the vehicles met emissions standards during
certification tests, under real-world driving conditions, the same vehicles
emitted up to forty times the threshold emission limits for NOx.41
The deception was discovered in 2013 when a team of researchers at West
Virginia University (WVU), working with a grant from the ICCT, conducted
studies of “eco-diesel” vehicles sold in the United States to determine if the cars
emitted the same amount of Nox in real-world driving as in the federal emissions
tests conducted before certification.42 The WVU team found that two VW
vehicles in the study emitted far more Nox than the threshold limits allowed—
sparking further investigation by both California Air Resources Board (CARB)
and the EPA.43
Both regulatory bodies re-tested the VW “eco-diesel” vehicles, using
supplementary real-world driving tests that used different driving conditions
than the tests previously performed, and confirmed the WVU lab’s findings.44
In response, VW recalled thousands of diesel vehicles in the United States,
claiming that a simple software update could fix the emissions issues.45
Meanwhile, EPA and CARB requested additional information from the
company, but VW provided false and misleading information to both regulatory
bodies and destroyed thousands of potentially incriminating documents.46 EPA
threatened to withhold certification of Model Year (MY) 2016 vehicles if VW
did not comply in the investigation—prompting VW to admit to equipping
eleven million of its “eco-diesel” vehicles with defeat devices and cheating on
emissions tests for nearly seven years.47
Despite a world-wide scandal, United States and Germany responded very
differently to the revelation of the emissions cheating. In the U.S., the EPA
issued a notice of violation in September 2015—publicizing the scandal and

40

Gates et al., supra note 8.
Id.
42
Jack Ewing, Engineering a Deception: What Led to Volkswagen’s Diesel Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-timeline.html?_
r=1.
43
GREGORY J. THOMPSON ET AL., W. VA. UNIV. CTR. FOR ALT. FUELS, ENGINES, & EMISSIONS, FINAL
REPORT: IN-USE EMISSIONS TESTING OF LIGHT-DUTY DIESEL VEHICLES IN THE UNITED STATES (2014),
https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/WVU_LDDV_in-use_ICCT_Report_Final_may2014.
pdf.
44
Ewing, supra note 43.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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initiating the enforcement process in the United States.48 However, in Europe,
VW argued—and continues to argue—that it did not violate EU or German law,
despite its admission of guilt to U.S. regulators.49
Following the notice of violation in the U.S., both the United States and
individual consumers filed suit against VW.50 Individuals that had purchased the
affected vehicles joined together in a class action to receive a $14.7 billion
settlement.51 Class members harmed by purchasing or leasing an affected
vehicle had two options in their remedy in addition to a restitution payment: the
consumer could elect to either have VW “buy-back” the vehicle or submit the
vehicle to VW to have appropriate fixes to the software made.52 VW agreed to
pay an additional $1.3 billion in a consumer settlement for another model of
affected vehicles.53 In contrast, there is no class action system for individual
complaints in Germany.54 Thus, the remedy primarily available for individuals
in Germany is a software fix in the emissions control system that VW claims
will bring the Nox emissions within EU threshold levels.55
The United States also filed a separate complaint against VW for Clean Air
Act violations and conspiring to defraud the U.S. Government.56 VW reached a
settlement with the U.S. DOJ in which it agreed to plead guilty to the alleged

48

Notice of Violation, supra note 7.
Danny Hakim, VW Admits Cheating in the U.S., but Not in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/business/international/vw-admits-cheating-in-the-us-but-not-in-europe.
html. See Tarsa, supra note 11, at 331 (arguing that Volkswagen has violated EU law in addition to U.S. law).
50
Consolidated Consumer Class Action Complaint, In re: Volkswagen ‘Clean Diesel’ Marketing, Sales
Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, No. 1230 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016) MDL 2672 CRB (JSC)
[hereinafter Consumer Class Action Complaint].
51
Amended Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Settlement (2.0 Liter Vehicles), In re: Volkswagen
“Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, No. 1698 (N.D. Cal. July 29,
2016) MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) [hereinafter 2.0 L Settlement]. See also Executive Summary of Final Class
Settlement Program (2.0 Liter Vehicles), In re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” MDL (N.D. Cal. 2016) MDL No.
2672 CRB (JSC), http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl/final-settlement-2-Liter (last visited Dec. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter 2.0 L Settlement Executive Summary]. Rule 11 Plea Agreement, supra note 13. Volkswagen Press
Release, supra note 13.
52
2.0 L Settlement, supra note 52, at 5–6. See also 2.0 L Settlement Executive Summary, supra note 52,
at 2.
53
Order Granting Final Approval of the Consumer and Reseller Dealership 3.0 – Liter Class Action
Settlement at 13, In re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability
Litigation, No. 3229 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2017) MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) [hereinafter 3.0 L Settlement]. See
also Executive Summary of Final Class Settlement Program for 3.0 Liter Engines, In Re: Volkswagen “Clean
Diesel” MDL, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/vwmdl/final-settlement-3-liter (last visited Dec. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter 3.0 L Settlement Executive Summary].
54
Ewing, supra note 5.
55
Id.
56
United States’ Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at 2.
49
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charges and to pay an additional $4.3 billion fine.57 Additionally, the U.S. has
separately indicted former executives of VW for criminal conspiracy charges.58
In Germany, the KBA has a practice of not filing a complaint against VW,
and the German government itself has a harder time acting against the
company.59 German prosecutors have said that they believe individuals at the
company took part in the scandal but have only recently begun to act on these
statements.60 VW maintains that it has not violated any German or European law
and that any wrongdoing can be attributed to rogue low-level employees and not
to the company or its executives.61 While the United States acted rapidly to
initiate an enforcement action against VW, Germany sought to remedy the
environmental harms and held a “diesel summit” during which VW presented
another software fix as a solution for the “eco-diesel” vehicles sold in Europe.62
Germany’s hesitance to hold VW accountable has not gone unnoticed. The EU
has initiated infringement procedures against Germany for failing to hold VW
accountable.63 Additionally, an environmental non-governmental organization
in Germany, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) filed suit against KBA for its failure
to adequately respond to the scandal.64 Following this pressure from the EU and
57

Rule 11 Plea Agreement, supra note 13, at 13; Volkswagen Press Release, supra note 13.
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, supra note 13; Ewing, supra note 43.
59
Tarsa, supra note 11, at 338. See Barbara Lewis & Kirstin Ridley, Facing U.S. Storm, VW Set for
Easier Ride in Europe on Emissions Scandal, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/usvolkswagen-emissions-fine/facing-u-s-storm-vw-set-for-easier-ride-in-europe-on-emissions-scandalidUSKBN0UN0A920160109 (noting circumstances that may cause Volkswagen to face reduced backlash in
Germany).
60
Jack Ewing, Former VW Engine Chief Arrested, Signaling Widening Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/business/volkswagen-diesel-cheating.html?rref=
collection%2Fbyline%2Fjack-ewing. Jack Ewing, Ex-Volkswagen Chief Investigated by Germany in Emissions
Cheating Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/business/volkswagengermany-winterkorn-diesel-emissions.html. See generally, Ewing, supra note 43.
61
Jack Ewing, Alexandra Stevenson, and Matthew Goldstein, Ex-VW Chief knew of Diesel Scheme Years
Earlier Than He Admitted, S.E.C. Says, N.Y.Times (Mar. 15, 2019) (Volkswagen’s position was that “the plot
to deceive American regulators about the exhaust levels of the company’s diesel vehicles was entirely the work
of lower-level employees, and that…top managers only learned of its shortly before the [EPA] publicly accused
[VW] of carrying it out in September 15.”), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/business/volkswagenwinterkorn-sec-fraud.html; see also Ewing, supra note 5 (VW originally stated in response to German customer
requests for civil action that, “our view is that there is no legal basis for customer claims.”); Tarsa, supra note
11.
62
Janosch Delcker & Joshua Posaner, 3 Takeaways from Germany’s Diesel Summit, POLITICO (Aug. 2,
2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/3-takeaways-from-germanys-diesel-summit/; Melissa Eddy & Jack
Ewing, As Europe Sours on Diesel, Germany Fights to Save It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/08/02/business/energy-environment/germany-diesel-car-emissions.html.
63
European Commission Press Release IP/16/4214, The Comm’n, Car Emissions: Commission Opens
Infringement Procedures Against 7 Member States for Breach of EU Rules (Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter
Infringement Procedures Press Release].
64
DUH Sues the KBA over Its Handling of the Emissions Scandal as BUND Calls for a Diesel Sales Ban,
58
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from the example set in the United States, Germany finally penalized the
carmaker nearly three years after the scandal was discovered.65
II. HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE REGULATION OF VEHICLE EMISSIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
Vehicle emissions regulations in the United States and Germany is markedly
different with respect to the relationship the countries have with their vehicle
manufacturing industries. Although both countries have regulatory structures
that allow for direct communication between industries and regulators, the
German regulations are more flexible while the United States’ regulations are
far more concrete. This section discusses both countries’ development of
regulatory agencies to combat vehicle emissions, statutory structures of vehicle
emissions control, processes for approving new motor vehicles, post-approval
testing of light-duty diesel vehicles, and enforcement mechanisms triggered
when violation of those regulations are discovered.
A. The Development of Agencies to Regulate Vehicle Emissions
In the United States, emission regulation for new motor vehicles began in
the early 1960s in California as a response to growing concern over
environmental and public health harms caused by air pollution.66 “Smog
episodes,” which caused burning eyes and lungs as well as nausea, plagued Los
Angeles; experts determined that limiting emissions from vehicles could
improve the terrible air quality.67 California responded by forming the California
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board, which approved exhaust control devices
and set emissions standards starting with MY 1966 vehicles.68
Amidst growing pressure from the States and President Johnson to
implement similar nation-wide limits on automobile emissions, the U.S.
Congress passed the Clean Air and Solid Waste Amendments of 1965.69 The
purpose of the amendments was to establish uniformity among vehicle emission
AUTOVISTA GRP. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.autovistagroup.com/news-and-insights/duh-sues-kba-over-itshandling-emissions-scandal-bund-calls-diesel-sales-ban. Deutsche Umwelthilfe translates to “German
Environmental Action.” Id.
65
Charles Riley, Germany Fines Volkswagen $1.2 Billion over Diesel Scandal, CNN MONEY (June 13,
2018, 1:11 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/13/investing/volkswagen-fine-germany/index.html.
66
Auto Pollution, Waste Disposal Act Passed, in CQ ALMANAC 780–86 (21st ed., 1965).
67
History, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (2017), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history.
68
Auto Pollution, Waste Disposal Act Passed, supra note 67; Chistopher Brestel, The California Motor
Vehicle Pollution Control Law, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 121, 122 (1962).
69
Auto Pollution, Waste Disposal Act Passed, supra note 67.
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controls by barring any new motor vehicle from entering the market unless it “is
in conformity with [Clean Air Act] regulations.”70 Emission control technology
already existed, but hearings in the House and the Senate noted that
manufacturers would not implement emissions controls unless ordered to do so
by the federal government.71 To meet these purposes, the Department of Health
Education and Welfare (HEW), now the EPA, created testing methods and
emissions standards to ensure that new motor vehicles would be equipped with
effective emissions controls.72
Today, the EPA is the regulatory body that promulgates all federal emissions
regulations and approves all new motor vehicles for sale in the United States.
CARB, through a special carve-out provision in the CAA, also sets standards
and tests vehicles for sale in California.73 Both the EPA and CARB have
maintained consistent missions to protect the public health and the environment
since their creation.74
In contrast, in 1951, Germany developed its vehicle emissions regulatory
body, the KBA, with the main purpose of regulating safety and traffic.75 The
KBA controlled the issuance of drivers’ licenses, kept a registration of vehicle
titles, and created a points system for violations of traffic laws.76 Following in
the footsteps of U.S. emissions control, some EU member states, such as
Germany and France, began adopting legislation on vehicle emissions and typeapprovals of new motor vehicles in 1970.77

70

S. REP. NO. 89-192, at 1–2 (1965).
Clean Air and Solid Waste Amendments of 1965: Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works Senate, 89 Cong. 1-10 (1965) (letter from Anthony J.
Calabrezze, Secretary of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to Hon. Pat McNamara, Chairman,
Committee on Public Works, Senate); Clean Air and Solid Waste Amendments of 1965: Hearings Before a
Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works Senate, 89 Cong. 1-10
(1965) (letter from Anthony J. Calabrezze, Secretary of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to Hon.
Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Public Works Committee,
Senate).
72
Auto Pollution, Waste Disposal Act Passed, supra note 67.
73
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (1955).
74
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, supra note 68; About EPA: Our Mission and What We Do, U.S.
EPA (last updated Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [hereinafter
EPA Mission].
75
Looking Back: Chronology, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT, (last updated Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.kba.
de/EN/DasKBA_en/Rueckblick_en/Zeittafel_en/zeittafel_inhalt_en.html?nn=642842 (translated from German)
[hereinafter Looking Back].
76
Id.
77
Comparative Study on the Differences Between the EU and US Legislation on Emissions in the
Automotive Sector, at 23, Study IP/A/EMIS/2016-2, PE 587.331 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Comparative Study].
71
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The EU was concerned not with ensuring uniform regulation of emissions
from new motor vehicles, but rather with the fact that individual state typeapproval systems could potentially “hinder the establishment and proper
functioning of the common market.”78 In other words, the EU sought to prevent
the enabling of individual states to control their internal vehicle market by
approving their own manufacturers’ new vehicles and not those of
manufacturers from other Member States.79 In 1970, the EU predecessor,80
consisting of only Germany and five other Member States at the time, adopted
Directive 70/22081 to ensure “free circulation of vehicles in the European
market.”82 This provision requires a manufacturer only to have a vehicle
approved by one Member States in order to sell that vehicle in all Member States
of the EU, putting regulatory bodies among Member States in competition with
one another.83
The EU did not set any emissions standards for light-duty diesel vehicles
until 1992 with the passage of EURO 1.84 Although the EU sets emissions
standards for all its member states, the states maintain their own regulatory
bodies to oversee type-approval processes and emissions standards for new
motor vehicles.85 There have been six levels of EU emissions standards so far,
with the most recent set of standards for new light-duty diesel vehicle emissions,
EURO 6, issued in September 2014.86
Within Germany, the KBA now regulates the type-approval of new motor
vehicles in addition to its longstanding authority over traffic and vehicle safety.87
While the scope of the KBA’s control has increased, the predominant purpose
of that regulatory body remains traffic safety rather than the protection of the
public health and natural environment.88

78

Council Directive 70/220/EEC, 1970 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 76/1) (EC).
Comparative Study, supra note 78.
80
At this time, the EU went by several other names, such as the European Economic Community (EEC).
The History of the European Union, European Union, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en
(last accessed April 2, 2019). For simplicity, this Comment refers to the “EU” rather than its previous names.
81
Council Directive 70/220/EEC, supra note 79.
82
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 12.
83
Council Directive 70/220/EEC, supra note 79.
84
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 14.
85
Id. at 32.
86
Id. at 21.
87
Type-approval Issuing, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT (last visited Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.kba.de/
EN/Typgenehmigung_en/Typgenehmigung_en/Typgenehmigungserteilung_en/typgenehmigungserteilung_no
de_en.html.
88
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 23; Looking Back, supra note 76.
79
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B. Statutory Structure of Vehicle Emissions Control
To market and sell a new motor vehicle in the United States, a manufacturer
must obtain approval by the EPA with a certificate of conformity that indicates
the vehicle complies with both federal environmental law set in the CAA and
agency regulations.89 The CAA authorizes the EPA to promulgate regulations
that set emissions standards as well as requirements for approval of new motor
vehicles, confirmatory testing, and post-approval enforcement for violations of
the CAA.90 Emissions standards for new light-duty diesel vehicles from 2004 to
2017 were the “Tier 2” standards.91 New, more stringent, “Tier 3” standards took
effect in early 2017.92 EPA regulations set requirements for the certification
process and describe the test cycles performed on vehicles submitted for
approval in 40 C.F.R. Part 86, Subpart B.93
The CAA sets out prohibited acts under Section 203, including provisions
prohibiting tampering with and negatively affecting the emissions control
systems within motor vehicles under 203(a)(3)(A) and (B).94 The enforcement
measures and penalties for violating the prohibited acts of Section 203 are set
out in Sections 204 and 205, respectively.95 The EPA has promulgated rules to
further regulate the new light-duty diesel certification process (40 C.F.R. 86)96
and created a recall procedure for vehicles that violate these requirements (40
C.F.R. 85).97
In Germany, emissions from new motor vehicles are both broadly regulated
by EU policy directives and more specifically set through KBA oversight.98
Through the European framework, Member States set and implement more
specific approval procedures for certifying new light-duty diesel vehicles to
enter commerce in compliance with EU directives.99 Within this system, new

89

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7525(a) (1977).
Id.
91
40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-04 (2000) (“Tier 2 standards”).
92
Id. 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-04 (2016) (“Tier 3 standards”).
93
40 C.F.R. § 86.101-166-17 (1977).
94
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7522 (2013).
95
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7523, 7524 (2013).
96
40 C.F.R. §§ 86.101–66-12 (1977).
97
40 C.F.R. §§ 85.1801–08 (1974).
98
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 35.
99
Council Directive 2007/46, 2007 O.J. (L 263) 1, 7–8 (EC); Air Pollution from the Main Sources - Air
Emissions from Road Vehicles, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/sources/road.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2018).
90
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light-duty diesel vehicles only need to be approved in one Member State of the
EU to be approved for sale in all other EU Member States.100
The common legal framework in the EU for type-approval of cars and other
vehicles is EU Directive 2007/46/EC.101 Euro 6 (715/2007/EC) sets the emission
limits for cars for regulated pollutants, particularly NOx.102 Regulation
692/2008/EC implements and amends the 715/2007/ EC on new light-duty
diesel vehicles.103 The EU may sue member countries in an infringement
procedure for failure to comply with these directives when approving new
vehicles to enter commerce.104
While the EU sets broader policy, it relies on Member States, like Germany,
to set more detailed requirements for new motor vehicles.105 The principal law
for emission control from new vehicles is the Federal Emission Control Act
(Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz) (BlmSchG).106 However, there is no principal
environmental regulator in Germany.107 Individual states within Germany tend
to carry out day-to-day responsibilities.108 The Federal Environmental Agency
(Umweltbundesamt) (UBA) only has limited regulatory authority over emission
trading.109 However, the Federal Motor Transport Authority (KraftfahrtBundesamt) (KBA) has the authority to approve vehicle types and parts, monitor
testing of motor vehicles, and “accompan[y] recall actions made by
manufacturers of vehicles and vehicle parts.”110 The KBA also has its own typeapproval requirements and testing procedure separate from the UBA.111
100
Council Directive 2007/46, art. 6, 2007 O.J. (L 263) 1, 8 (EC); Council Directive 70/220, 1970 O.J. (L
76/1) 171, 172 (EC).
101
Council Directive 2007/46, 2007 O.J. (L 263) 1, 1 (EC).
102
Council Directive 715/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 171) 1, 1 (EC).
103
Council Directive 692/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 199) 1, 1 (EC). The European Commission has stated that it
will implement a new testing procedure for vehicles called the Real Driving Emissions test procedure (RDE)
starting in September 2017. Press Release, European Comm’n Testing of Emissions from Cars (May 4, 2018),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3646_en.pdf.
104
Infringement Procedure, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-makingprocess/overview-law-making-process/applying-eu-law/monitoring-implementation-eu-directives/
infringement-procedure_en.
105
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 23.
106
David Elshorst & Amrei Fuder, Environmental Law and Practice in Germany: Overview, Westlaw:
Practical
Law
(Aug.
1,
2015),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/4-503-0486?transitionType=
Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170510140044708&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA) - Federal Motor Transport Authority, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT,
https://www.kba.de/EN/Home/home_node.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).
111
Information Sheet on Approvals for “New Technologies or Concepts”, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT
(June
2011),
https://www.kba.de/EN/Typgenehmigung_en/Zum_Herunterladen_en/
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C. Approval of New Motor Vehicles
In the United States, a vehicle manufacturer must submit an application to
the EPA that provides a description of the vehicle model, a list of any auxiliary
emissions control devices (AECDs) that are within the vehicle and may alter its
emissions, and justifications for including those AECDs.112 Additionally, the
manufacturer submits emissions data from its own testing on the new model.113
Because vehicle manufacturers generally issue new model year versions of a
vehicle for each fiscal year, these applications are submitted annually, and the
information contained within those applications cannot rely on past approvals
for earlier model years of the same vehicle family.114 The EPA then evaluates
the information in the application and verify the emissions data the manufacturer
submits through its own emissions tests.115 The EPA then makes the test results
and emissions data for certified vehicles publicly available.116
In Germany, KBA approval of a new motor vehicle allows for its sale not
only in Germany but also throughout the entire European Union.117 In fact,
European manufacturers often choose to send applications for type-approval for
component parts of vehicles to Luxembourg, and then submit whole vehicle
type-approval (WVTA) applications to Germany’s KBA—a method which is
often favored due to a common belief that those regulatory bodies are more
amenable to manufacturers.118
In Germany, only one test vehicle is required for approval applications to be
the representative of all possible configurations of a vehicle for type-approval.119
In effect, the vehicle tested and approved in Germany may not actually be
sold.120 Additionally, applications for approval do not need to be made
ErteilungTypgenehmigungen_en/mtk_2011_07_pdf_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4; see also Elshorst &
Fuder, supra note 107; KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT, supra note 111.
112
Certification and Fuel Economy for Light-Duty Passenger Cars and Trucks, U.S. EPA (last updated
Dec. 8, 2017) (citing Application for Certification, Control of Air Pollution from Mobile Sources, 40 C.F.R.
§ 86 (1977)), https://www.epa.gov/vehicle-and-engine-certification/certification-and-fuel-economy-light-dutypassenger-cars-and-trucks [hereinafter Certification for Light-Duty Trucks].
113
Application for Certification, Control of Air Pollution from Mobile Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 86 (1977).
114
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 32.
115
Certification for Light-Duty Trucks, supra note 113.
116
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(e) (2013); 40 C.F.R. 2.301(d) (1976).
117
Council Directive 2007/46, 2007 O.J. (L 263) 1, 14–15 (EC); see also Type-Approval Issuing,
KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT,
https://www.kba.de/EN/Typgenehmigung_en/Typgenehmigung_en/
Typgenehmigungserteilung_en/typgenehmigungserteilung_node_en.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
118
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 34.
119
A single test vehicle can be sufficient to represent numerous engine sizes and even models of the same
vehicle. Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 33–34.
120
Id. at 34.
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annually—a manufacturer can rely on past approvals for earlier model year
versions of a vehicle to sell new model years without applying for approval
again.121
In its application, the manufacturer submits the data from emissions tests it
has completed on the test vehicle itself.122 The KBA does not have to re-test the
vehicle to ensure conformity with the results presented by the manufacturer.123
Rather, it will do an “initial assessment” where it will inspect the premises of
the manufacturer to determine that there are measures in place to ensure quality
control.124 Approval may be granted simply because the manufacturer has
demonstrated that there is a “quality-management system . . . in place.”125 Even
if the KBA decides to conduct its own emissions tests, the results are not made
public because they are protected as competitive information.126
D. Post-approval Compliance Assurance
The United States and Germany differ drastically in whether and how their
regulatory bodies continue to communicate with vehicle manufacturers after a
vehicle has been approved for sale. There are two key differences in the
compliance measures that both countries utilize: continued on-road compliance
testing and market surveillance testing.
In the United States, both manufacturers and the EPA conduct on-road
testing of vehicles after they have been issued a certificate of conformity.127
Manufacturers are required to complete compliance testing for an approved
vehicle after it has reached 10,000 miles and then again at 50,000 miles.128 The
EPA also completes on-road testing at 20,000 miles and at 90,000 miles.129 Both
121
Id.; STRAßENVERKEHRS-ZULASSUNGS-ORDNUNG [STVZO] [ROAD TRAFFIC LICENSING
REGULATIONS], § 19, para. 2, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stvzo_2012/__19.html (“The vehicle’s typeapproval, if not expressly withdrawn, shall remain in effect until its final decommissioning. It expires when (1)
the vehicle type approved in the type-approval is changed, (2) danger to road users is to be expected, or (3) the
exhaust or noise behavior is deteriorated.”). The translation is provided by GOOGLE TRANSLATE,
https://translate.google.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
122
Type
Approval,
KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT,
https://www.kba.de/EN/Typgenehmigung_en/
Zum_Herunterladen_en/zum_Herunterladen_node_en.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
123
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 32.
124
Id. at 36.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 35; Vehicle Emissions Testing in the European Union, Fact Sheet: Europe, INT’L COUNCIL ON
CLEAN TRANSP. 2 (June 2016), https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/ICCT_facts_EU-emissions-testing_
jun2016.pdf.
127
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (1977).
128
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 39; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (1977).
129
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 39.
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groups thus continue to communicate results with each other about the emissions
and long-term performance of approved vehicles.130
Additionally, states conduct market surveillance testing.131 Depending on
the state, additional inspection and maintenance requirements are imposed on
vehicles.132 For example, in Georgia, emissions testing is required for state
registration purposes.133 For California and other states that adopt CARB
standards, vehicles are legally mandated to have an on-board diagnostics system
(OBD).134 This is an operating system on a vehicle that alerts drivers of any
problems that the vehicle may be having—whether it is a failure of an emissions
control device or a tire that needs more air.135
In the EU and Germany, there are far fewer post-approval requirements for
vehicles. In the EU, post-approval compliance testing is required up to five years
after approval or when the vehicle has reached 100,000 kilometers, whichever
comes first.136 The testing performed does not need to be under real-world
driving conditions for light duty vehicles, although it is required for heavy duty
vehicles.137 But, because the results of these tests are not published, it is unclear
whether Member State regulatory bodies and manufacturers are completing
these post-approval tests.138
If there is any testing performed post-approval, it is because vehicle
manufacturers voluntarily commissioned it themselves.139 There is no
independent testing conducted by either EU or German regulatory bodies;140
either manufacturers or third-party labs conduct additional on-road emissions
tests.141

130

Id.
Id.
132
Id. at 48.
133
View an Overview of Emissions Testing, GA. CLEAN AIR FORCE, http://www.cleanairforce.com/
motorists/emissions-testing/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
134
On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/obdprog/
obdprog.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
135
David Sosnowski & Edward Gardetto, Performing Onboard Diagnostic System Checks as Part of a
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program, U.S. EPA, Report No. EPA420-R-01-015 (June 2001); What is
OBD?, OBD SOLUTIONS, http://www.obdsol.com/knowledgebase/on-board-diagnostics/what-is-obd.
136
Council Directive 715/2007, art. 4, 2007 O.J. (L 171) 6 (EC).
137
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 37.
138
Id.
139
Peter Mock & John German, White Paper on The Future of Vehicle Emissions Testing and Compliance,
INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. (ICCT) at 12–13 (Nov. 2015), https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/
publications/ICCT_future-vehicle-testing_20151123.pdf.
140
See id. at 13.
141
Id. at 12.
131
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The EU leaves it to Member States to determine additional requirements for
a market surveillance program that will comply with broad EU policy
mandates.142 However, in practice most state programs for post-approval market
surveillance have been discontinued.143 The most recent form of any market
surveillance data gathering was an ad hoc investigation of VW light-duty diesel
vehicles.144 Germany conducted this surveillance only after the United States
had initiated enforcement actions against VW for its emissions cheating
scandal.145 Currently, Member States, including Germany, remain reluctant to
maintain regular market surveillance programs in place to gather on-road
emissions data as a preventative measure.146
E. Enforcement Mechanisms Available Upon Finding Emissions Violations
The availability of enforcement actions in the event of a violation of
environmental law by a vehicle manufacturer is wildly different between the
United States and Germany. In the United States, recourse for violations comes
in several forms: agency enforcement, civil and criminal claims brought by the
U.S. government, citizen-suits, and private consumer claims.147
If the EPA finds a manufacturer’s vehicle to be non-compliant, the CAA
requires the agency to issue a recall of those vehicles.148 Additionally, the EPA
can withdraw its certification of conformity for a previously-approved vehicle
and withhold certification for new model years of that vehicle that present the
same problems.149 Withholding or removing certification can cause the
manufacturer to lose a significant amount of revenue from potential U.S. sales,
so this can be a powerful tool to engage a non-compliant manufacturer in
assisting the EPA to remedy harms done.150

142

Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 37–38.
Id. at 37–38.
144
Id. at 38–39.
145
Id. at 49.
146
Id. at 38–39.
147
Infra, nn. 149–162 and accompanying text.
148
See 42 U.S.C. § 7541 (2013).
149
42 U.S.C. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(i) (2013).
150
See, e.g., Ryan Beene & Jamie Butters, Fiat Chrysler Can Resume Sales of Diesel Jeeps, Rams, in U.S.,
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-28/fiat-chryslergets-approval-to-sell-diesel-jeeps-rams-in-u-s (“The [E.P.A. and CARB] had withheld certification that
emissions-control software on the vehicles complied with clean-air standards after finding violations in earlier
models.”); Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 5 (“VW made the admission only when the Environmental Protection
Agency took the extraordinary action of threatening to withhold approval for the company’s 2016 Volkswagen
and Audi diesel models . . . . “).
143
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The EPA may also initiate an enforcement action with the manufacturer.151
To begin this process, the EPA sends a notice of violation to the manufacturer
that has allegedly violated environmental law and regulations.152 This opens a
line of dialogue between the manufacturer and the EPA to determine how best
to remedy the alleged harms caused.153 If the manufacturer does not adequately
work with EPA to remedy the harms alleged, the EPA refers the case to the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ).
The DOJ will generally first seek to work cooperatively with the defendant
to achieve a negotiated resolution in the form of a consent decree.154 However,
if this fails, the DOJ may use its prosecutorial discretion, after considering the
litigation risks, to decide whether to litigate the matter in federal district court.155
Additionally, it may bring criminal claims for some violations of environmental
law.156 If a large manufacturer allegedly conspired with other manufacturers to
cheat emissions tests, the DOJ can bring a conspiracy claim.157
Even if the U.S. government fails to sue for environmental law violations, a
private person can bring a citizen-suit to enforce the CAA.158 Private plaintiffs
can file complaints against the manufacturer for personal harms. For example,
individual consumers that purchase vehicles that are CAA non-compliant can
file suit for the personal harms caused by purchasing a vehicle they believed
would comply with emissions regulations. These private plaintiffs can join to
form a class action.159

151

See 42 U.S.C. § 7523 (2013); Recall Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 85.1801–08 (1974).
See, e.g., Notice of Violation, supra note 7.
153
See, e.g., id.
154
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 5-12.530 (2018). The DOJ will generally attempt to
reach a negotiated resolution with the defendant…but will maintain an action parallel to settlement negotiations
to induce active participation from the defendant. Id. The DOJ will seek public comment for thirty days on any
proposed judgment reached through settlement negotiations. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1973). After the public comment
period ends, and all the comments are considered, the DOJ will move to enter the consent decree by filing a
motion to enter stating that the consent decree is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 5-12.620 (2018).
155
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 62; Basic Information on Enforcement, U.S. EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-basic-information (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
156
Basic Information on Enforcement, supra note 156.
157
Cf. Adam Goldman, Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing, F.B.I. Arrests Volkswagen Executive on
Conspiracy Charge in Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/
business/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-investigation-settlement.html.
158
Citizen Suits, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1955).
159
Consumer Class Action Complaint, supra note 51.
152
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Sometimes, the class action of private plaintiffs can join in a multi-district
litigation (MDL) with the United States.160 This mechanism has benefits for both
those bringing claims and the manufacturer at issue. Those bringing claims may,
through consolidated discovery, use the technical expertise brought by the EPA
and the United States as well as the data that EPA has amassed through its
rigorous approval and compliance testing.161 The manufacturer may benefit by
avoiding potentially inconsistent outcomes from multiple small actions across
the country.162
Meanwhile, in Germany, there are far fewer options for remedying harms
caused from vehicle manufacturers violating German and EU environmental
law. The KBA may withdraw the type-approval for a vehicle found to no longer
follow emissions limits.163 But in this case, this was not done.164 Because a
manufacturer may take their business elsewhere for EU type-approval, there is
pressure on the KBA to keep the manufacturer’s business.165 Withdrawing a
type-approval may be perceived as the State agency failing in its job rather than
as a recourse for violations.166 Compounding these difficulties, the KBA
appeared to lack the express authority to initiate a recall of vehicles.167 Rather,
KBA stated that it may “accompany” a recall that has been initiated by the
manufacturer, making it unlikely to happen.168 However, after mounting global

160

Multidistrict Litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1968).
David F. Herr, Ann. Manual Complex Lit. § 20.14 (4th ed. 2018) (“Judges should encourage techniques
that coordinate discovery and avoid duplication. . .Relevant discovery already completed should ordinarily be
made available to litigants in the other cases.”); see also, Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman,
Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 ULJ 1634, 1644–45 (April 2017) (In a case studies of various agencyinitiated aggregate litigation, a noted benefit is the pooling of information and securing of expert assistance.).
162
Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action,
64 EMORY L.J. 399, 427 n.112, 416 (2014). Of course, there can be some negatives to a class action for a
defendant. The cost of being liable increases dramatically and some believe that it is harder for a defendant to
succeed in a federal class action. Sullivan, Floyd, Freer, & Clary, COMPLEX LITIGATION, 131–32 (2d ed. 2014).
163
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 50.
164
Cf. id. at 50.
165
See Council Directive 2007/46, 2007 O.J. (L 263) (EC).
166
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 49.
167
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA) - Federal Motor Transport Authority, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT,
https://www.kba.de/EN/Home/home_node.html (last visited April 3, 2019) (KBA’s website states that it
“accompanies recall actions by manufacturers of vehicles and vehicle parts.”); Recalls, Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA) – Federal Motor Transport Authority, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT, https://www.kba.de/EN/
Marktueberwachung_en/Rueckrufe_en/rueckrufe_node_en.html (last visited April 3, 2019) (“Recalls are carried
out by manufacturers to be able to eliminate product faults.”). See also Information Sheet on Approvals for “New
Technologies or Concepts”, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT (June 2011), https://www.kba.de/EN/
Typgenehmigung_en/Zum_Herunterladen_en/ErteilungTypgenehmigungen_en/mtk_2011_07_pdf_en.pdf?__b
lob=publicationFile&v=4.
168
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA) - Federal Motor Transport Authority, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT,
https://www.kba.de/EN/Home/home_node.html (last visited April 3, 2019) (KBA’s website states that it
161
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pressure to address the Volkswagen emissions scandal, KBA initiated a recall of
un-retrofitted affected VW diesels for the first time in June 2018—three years
after the admission of fault in the U.S.169 This recall applied to consumers that
did not get their vehicle repaired—not to the entire fleet of affected cars.170
Additionally, because of the flexible approval mechanisms for type-approval
in the EU and the lack of defined penalties for violations, it is difficult for a
Member State to file civil claims against an allegedly violating manufacturer.171
There is no precedent for Germany filing such a claim in its federal courts.172
States of Germany may bring claims against a manufacturer, but no action has
been taken with respect to environmental harms at the national level.173 If a
German state files a claim, the action tends to be an investor suit alleging harm
relating to its holdings in a manufacturer whose stock has decreased due to
ongoing litigation in another country.174
As with withdrawing type-approval, there is both economic and political
pressure on Germany not to file a civil claim against a vehicle manufacturer.
VW employs 750,000 people in Germany,175 and its sales make up a large
percentage of the country’s revenue.176 The states of Germany are themselves
“accompanies recall actions by manufacturers of vehicles and vehicle parts.”); Recalls, Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA)–Federal Motor Transport Authority, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT, https://www.kba.de/EN/
Marktueberwachung_en/Rueckrufe_en/rueckrufe_node_en.html (last visited April 3, 2019) (“Recalls are carried
out by manufacturers to be able to eliminate product faults.”)
169
Due to Lack of Retrofitting: First Diesel Forcibly Shut Down, Automobilwoche (June 6, 2018),
https://www.automobilwoche.de/article/20180606/AGENTURMELDUNGEN/306069939/wegen-fehlendernachruestung-erste-diesel-zwangsweise-stillgelegt (last visited April 3, 2019) (Google translate). See also,
David Jolley, VW owners in Germany Risk De-Registration If They Don’t Fix Cheat Vehicles, Automotive News
Europe (Aug. 16, 2018), https://europe.autonews.com/article/20180816/ANE/180819891/vw-owners-ingermany-risk-de-registration-if-they-don-t-fix-cheat-diesels (last visited April 3, 2019).
170
Due to Lack of Retrofitting: First Diesel Forcibly Shut Down, Automobilwoche (June 6, 2018),
https://www.automobilwoche.de/article/20180606/AGENTURMELDUNGEN/306069939/wegen-fehlendernachruestung-erste-diesel-zwangsweise-stillgelegt (last visited April 3, 2019) (Google translate). See also,
David Jolley, VW owners in Germany Risk De-Registration If They Don’t Fix Cheat Vehicles, Automotive News
Europe (Aug. 16, 2018), https://europe.autonews.com/article/20180816/ANE/180819891/vw-owners-ingermany-risk-de-registration-if-they-don-t-fix-cheat-diesels (last visited April 3, 2019).
171
Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
172
Id.
173
German States of Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg Sue VW over Dieselgate, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2016)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-litigation/german-states-of-hesse-badenwuerttemberg-sue-vw-over-dieselgate [hereinafter German States Sue]; Patrick McGee, German Court Clears
Way for Investors to Sue Volkswagen, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
30f9f0d2-5d86-11e6-a72a-bd4bf1198c63.
174
See, e.g., German States Sue, supra note 174; McGee, supra note 174.
175
Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
176
Alanna Petroff, What Volkswagen Means to the German Economy, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2015, 8:00
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/22/news/economy/volkswagen-germany-cars-economy/index.html.
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large shareholders in the company, and many of the country’s top political
leaders have business ties to the manufacturer as well.177 Given these strong
incentives towards maintaining VW’s viability and profitability, one of the few
legal recourses available in Germany is for one of its states to sue a manufacturer
for misrepresentation, fraud, or conspiracy.178
There is little oversight on the part of the EU to ensure states are enforcing
environmental law, but the EU may commence infringement procedures against
Germany itself for failing to uphold environmental law.179 This is rare and can
be defended easily due to broad language in the EU Environmental Policy
Directives.180 For example, VW has argued that it is not guilty in Europe for the
same emissions violations to which it pleaded guilty in the United States because
the language in EU policy directives is much more ambiguous.181
Individuals are also left with little recourse for environmental and personal
harms. Unlike in the United States, there is no citizen-suit provision in German
environmental law to allow a private person to bring a federal environmental
claim.182 Individual plaintiffs cannot form a class action for personal tort claims
against a vehicle manufacturer either.183 This results in far fewer claims against
alleged violators of environmental harms because the litigation costs of bringing
a claim as an individual consumer plaintiff is so high.184

177
Ewing, supra note 11; Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Avoids Effort to Beef Up Oversight in German State
Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/business/volkswagen-germanyelection.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fjack-ewing (“The state of Lower Saxony owns a [twenty] percent
stake in Volkswagen, and the party in power has a strong say over company strategy.”).
178
Ewing, Ex-Volkswagen Chief Investigated by Germany in Emissions Cheating Scandal, supra note 61.
While a criminal prosecution can happen, the action cannot be brought for violations of environmental law.
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 70–71.
179
Infringement Procedure, supra note 105; Infringement Procedures Press Release, supra note 64.
180
Tarsa, supra note 11, at 338.
181
Id.
182
Ewing, supra note 5.
183
Id.
184
Wright & Miller, History and Purpose of the Class Action, 7A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1751 (3d ed.
2018) (“The obvious advantage of the representative suit was that it was far cheaper and more convenient to
maintain a single proceeding in equity than to adjudicate the controversy in piecemeal fashion by multiple
actions at law.”). Such costs may be of obtaining multiple expert witnesses—on vehicle emissions devices,
software programming of such devices, and vehicle emissions capture, retaining legal counsel for what may be
years of legal battle, and to attain the resources it may take to mount a battle that could possibly meet the
resources of the defendant, a massive worldwide corporation. See, e.g., David Shepardson, U.S. Lawyers Suing
Volkswagen Get $300 Million in Fees, Costs, Reuters (July 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usvolkswagen-emissions/u-s-lawyers-suing-volkswagen-get-300-million-in-fees-costs-idUSKBN1A62HE (last
visited April 3, 2019).
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III. DON’T FIX IT: AN ARGUMENT FOR CONTINUING SUCCESSFUL VEHICLE
EMISSION REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The marked difference between U.S. and German responses to the VW
emission cheating scandal illustrates the ineffectiveness of Germany’s flexible
environmental regulations. As it stands, the United States has a clear federal
regulatory structure that both provides directives for industry to follow as well
as administrative and individual means of recourse for violations of those
directives. Because of this regulatory structure, both the U.S. government and
classes of American consumers have been able not only to file claims against
VW for its violations, but also to receive a significant settlement amount in
response to those violations. Meanwhile, Germany has yet to initiate any
meaningful response to VW’s admitted violations due to its more flexible
regulatory scheme.
Germany is in a race to the bottom with other EU Member States in which
it must compete for vehicle manufacturer business by lowering its own approval
standards. The United States is not in this race. This Comment proposes that (1)
the United States has no reason to lower its standards to that of Germany when
it is not in competition for vehicle manufacturer business, and (2) there are
concrete examples of how the United States’ vehicle emission regulations have
proved robust and effective in its response to the VW emissions cheating
scandal.
A. A Race to the Bottom Is Not a Competition the United States Wants to Win
Vehicle emissions regulation in the United States is so effective because the
EPA does not have to compete with any other regulatory bodies for vehicle
manufacturers’ business.185 Rather, it stands as the gatekeeper for manufacturers
to bring new vehicles into the large U.S. market.186 Congress intended the EPA
to have the power to uniformly ban any new motor vehicles that are not in
compliance with federal environmental law, so the EPA is granted deference in
the realm of vehicle emissions regulation and new motor vehicle approval.187
185
See Testing and Issuance of Certificate of Conformity, Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Engine
Compliance Testing and Certification, CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (1977); Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 5. Contra
Council Directive 2007/46, supra note 102.
186
See Testing and Issuance of Certificate of Conformity, Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Engine
Compliance Testing and Certification, CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (1977).
187
S. Rpt. 89-192, at 1–2 (1965); Clean Air and Solid Waste Amendments of 1965: Hearings before a
Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works Senate, 89 Cong. 1-10
(1965) (letter from Anthony J. Calabrezze, Secretary of HEW to Hon. Pat McNamara, Chairman, Committee on
Public Works, Senate), at 9–12; Clean Air and Solid Waste Amendments of 1965: Hearings before a Special
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The EPA’s exclusive authority created a long-standing relationship between
the EPA and manufacturers and has established a clear separation between
regulator and regulated.188 Both manufacturers and the EPA generally know
what is expected of them in the emissions certification process, so there is little
room for ambiguity or arguments over loopholes in permissible emissions
controls.189 This relationship not only has fostered consistent standards, but also
has created accountability for manufacturers that wish to conduct business
within the United States.190
In the United States, manufacturers have no choice but to comply with the
clear regulations set by the EPA so that they may sell their vehicles in the U.S.
market.191 It is this single regulatory pathway that provided the EPA enough
strength not only to obtain compliance with VW in investigating the emissions
cheating scandal, but even to obtain an admission of guilt.192 The EPA utilized
its powerful position to threaten to withhold certification of model year 2016
VW eco-diesel vehicles unless the company complied in providing further
information on the allegedly affected vehicles.193 Not only did VW provide that
information and open itself up to further investigation, but it also admitted to
being guilty of cheating on the federal emissions tests and putting eleven million
over-emitting vehicles on the road world-wide.194

Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works Senate, 89 Cong. 1-10 (1965)
(letter from Anthony J. Calabrezze, Secretary of HEW to Hon. Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Public Works Committee, Senate), at 13.
188
See generally EPA Mission, supra note 75; Certification for Light-Duty Trucks, supra note 113.
189
See Prohibited Acts, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7522 (2013). Even if there is still some room for
ambiguity, the U.S. EPA releases advisory-circulars to help fill-in the gaps. See U.S. EPA, Advisory Circular
24-3: Implementation of Requirements Prohibiting Defeat Devices for On-Highway Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines
(Jan. 19, 2001); Danny Hakim & Claire Barthelemy, VW’s Emissions-Test Trickery May Not Be Illegal in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/business/international/vw-scandaleu-emissions-tests.html?_r=0 (“[T]he settings of the engine and the engine controls shall be those prescribed by
the manufacturer.”).
190
Testing and Issuance of Certificate of Conformity, Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Engine
Compliance Testing and Certification, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (1977); Actions to Restrain
Violations, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7523 (2013). See Ewing, Engineering a Deception: What Led to
Volkswagen’s Diesel Scandal, supra note 43; Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 5 (“VW made the admission only
when the [EPA] took the extraordinary action of threatening to withhold approval for the company’s 2016
Volkswagen and Audi diesel models . . . .”).
191
Actions to Restrain Violations, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7523 (2013); see Vlasic & Kessler, supra
note 5.
192
Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 5.
193
Id.; Ewing, supra note 43.
194
Ewing, supra note 43; Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 190; Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 5.
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Meanwhile, in the EU, forum-shopping for a Member State’s approval
resulted in a race to the bottom that Germany has won.195 Manufacturers can
shop around for a regulatory body that is most amenable to their needs.196
Because state regulators are competing to gain a manufacturer’s business, there
is far less emphasis on maintaining strict rules and regulations; instead, Member
States have become so amenable to industry that the regulators cannot truly
regulate.197
The purpose of this structure is primarily to protect the common market198—
not to protect the environment or public health, as in the United States.199 The
state agencies are purposefully placed in competition with one another to protect
a manufacturer’s ability to sell vehicles in all EU Member States.200 Instead of
developing regulations that will better air quality, the KBA develops regulations
that will help it attract industry.201 Consequently, Germany has garnered a
reputation as one of the most lenient Member States from which to obtain
emissions approval.202
The prize for reaching the bottom is a state regulator that is so dependent on
a domestic manufacturer’s business203 that it cannot hold it accountable for clear
and obvious harms to human health and the environment.204 The KBA must
attract manufacturers, and a major way to do so is to leave regulations
ambiguous and to defer to manufacturers to set the standard rather than the
agency itself.205 This leaves the KBA subject to the interests of manufacturers—
especially domestic manufacturers like VW.206 VW is one of the country’s

195
196
197
198

Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 34.
Council Directive 2007/46, supra note 102, at 1, 2, 7, 19.
Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 190; Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 14, 23, 32, 62; Council Directive 70/220/EEC, supra note 79, at

171.
199

EPA Mission, supra note 75.
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 69, 70, 81.
201
Elshorst & Fuder, supra note 107; Type-Approval Issuing, KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT, https://www.
kba.de/EN/Typgenehmigung_en/Typgenehmigung_en/Typgenehmigungserteilung_en/typgenehmigungserteilu
ng_node_en.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
202
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 34.
203
Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60; Petroff, supra note 177.
204
See Anenberg et al., supra note 17; Chossiere et al., supra note 10; Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Why and
How They Are Controlled, supra note 21, at 1, 5, 8, 34.
205
Type
Approval,
KRAFTFAHRT-BUNDESAMT,
https://www.kba.de/EN/
Typgenehmigung_en/Zum_Herunterladen_en/zum_Herunterladen_node_en.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2017);
Council Directive 2007/26, 2007 O.J. (L 263) (EC); Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 33–34; Lewis &
Ridley, supra note 60.
206
See, e.g., Tarsa, supra note 11; see Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60; Comparative Study, supra note 78,
at 61.
200
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largest companies.207 Any sort of loss to VW—like the drop-in stock prices
following the revelation of the emissions cheating crisis—is a loss to the German
economy.208 This presents a conflict of interest for the KBA or German
government as holding VW accountable—through any attempts at further
regulation of the manufacturer—will result in harm to the country itself.209
In the United States, however, the EPA and U.S. government do not face this
race to the bottom, thus have no real incentive to weaken the vehicle emissions
regulations in place.210 It is unsurprising that the United States could adequately
respond to the VW emissions cheating scandal while Germany has yet to act.211
There is no need to change the regulatory approach that has proven effective in
the United States to mimic that of countries, like Germany and other EU Member
States, that are fighting a battle in which we are not competing. As further
information surfaces regarding other automakers that may be cheating on
emissions testing,212 the United States needs to remain a strong enforcer. The
United States should not seek out the bottom—as Germany already has—for the
sake of finding it, and it is not an enviable position when faced with a major
scandal that has caused world-wide harm to both the environment and public
health.213
B. Already on Top: Two Examples of Regulatory Tools that the United States
Used to Prevail in the VW Emissions Scandal
The United States’ vehicle emission regulations provide effective tools for
the EPA to respond to unprecedented violations such as the VW emissions
cheating scandal. Meanwhile Germany’s KBA has few means to ensure vehicles
are not over-emitting nor to hold manufacturers that may violate environmental
law accountable. The United States could adequately respond to VW because of
two key regulatory tools: (1) post-approval compliance assurance measures to
root out problems in vehicles on the road and (2) enforcement mechanisms upon
the finding of a violation.

207
208
209
210

Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
Ewing, supra note 11; Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
Hakim, supra note 50; Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
See Certification for Light-Duty Trucks, U.S. EPA, supra note 113; Comparative Study, supra note 78,

at 36.
211

Hakim, supra note 50; Lewis & Ridley, supra note 60.
See DOJ Press Release, supra note 28.
213
Chossiere et al., supra note 10; Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Why and How They Are Controlled, supra note
21; Anenberg et al., supra note 17.
212
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1. Compliance Assurance Requirements in the United States Helped to
Catch VW
Compliance assurance requirements, like post-approval testing of vehicles
by both the EPA and the manufacturer itself, continue to hold manufacturers
accountable in the United States after the vehicles are sold.214 Although there is
always room for improvement in motor vehicle compliance assurance,215 the
tools that the United States employs to ensure continued emission compliance
made it possible to catch VW.216 Outside researchers, like the CAFEE scientists
at WVU, may test vehicles on the market and provide their data to both bodies.217
This functions as a safeguard so that possible violations that did not appear in
standard federal emissions testing, like the modifications to the affected VW
eco-diesel vehicles that cheated on federal emissions tests, may be found in realworld driving conditions.218 State required tests and systems—like the required
Onboard Diagnostic System for vehicles sold in California—are additional
safeguards in the United States that continue monitoring vehicles on a consumerlevel as well.219 All these combined measures serve to make it extremely
difficult to “cheat the system.”
This also maintains a strong line of communication between the EPA and
manufacturers such that if potential violations are noticed, the two bodies may
work together to determine not only the cause but also a solution. For example,
in the VW emissions cheating scandal, the EPA received data from WVU

214
Certification for Light-Duty Trucks, supra note 113; Motor vehicle and motor vehicle engine
compliance testing and certification, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7525(a) (1977). See also Comparative Study,
supra note 78, at 36–37.
215
Supra Introduction Subpart C.
216
Motor vehicle and motor vehicle engine compliance testing and certification, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§7525(a) (1977).
217
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 39. See generally, THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 44.
218
Comparative Study, supra note 78, at 39. See generally THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 44. There is a
potential risk of third-party researching facilities conducting post-approval emissions testing for the benefit of
manufacturers. For example, the New York Times recently reported that a study on the health effects of breathing
in the emissions from a Volkswagen Golf was not only sponsored by Volkswagen itself, but also used a vehicle
provided by Volkswagen that had a different emissions control device that performed far better than the actual
vehicles Volkswagen went on to sell to consumers. Ewing, supra note 14. But, the vehicle used in that study
was not a car that had been sold on the market but rather a separate test vehicle provided by the manufacturer.
Id. The compliance assurance testing done by West Virginia University that first noticed the emissions problem
utilized Volkswagen “eco-diesel” vehicles that were already on the market in the United States. THOMPSON ET
AL., supra note 44.
219
See, e.g., On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) Program, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/obdprog/obdprog.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2018); see also for an example of
Georgia’s state emissions monitoring program, An Overview of Emissions Testing, GEORGIA’S CLEAN AIR
FORCE, http://www.cleanairforce.com/motorists/emissions-testing/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
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scientists that VW diesel vehicles were emitting higher than permissible
levels.220 The EPA not only conducted its own testing of the vehicles, but also
informed VW of the problem and began attempts at working together to
determine the cause of the issue.221 Although VW was not immediately
forthcoming with information that may help EPA in remedying the
environmental harm caused by the over-emitting vehicles,222 EPA could use its
post-approval testing power to determine that the vehicles were, in fact, in
violation and to request further information from VW.223
In Germany, the communication between manufacturer and regulator is
minimal and only lasts up until approval of the new vehicle in question.224 The
minimal communication leaves a lot of ambiguity in what is expected of
manufacturers and regulators when matters go awry and makes it nearly
impossible to ensure compliance with existing regulations once the vehicle has
been approved.225 This makes it far easier to let potentially illegal modifications
to new vehicles fly under the radar.226 Although there is one required postapproval test,227 it does not have to be under any real-world driving conditions
and the results do not have to be published.228 So, there is no accountability for
either the manufacturers or the KBA to ensure that these tests are accurate and
reflecting satisfactory emissions data.
The lack of communication results in the KBA deferring to the expertise of
manufacturers and largely letting the manufacturer do what it wishes, creating a
system in which there is only minimal work required on the part of the
manufacturer to be approved and to also maintain approval from Germany.229
Thus, while in the United States researchers discovered over-emissions in the
VW eco-diesel vehicles, and the EPA and CARB had initiated additional testing
and solicited further information from VW, Germany had yet to uncover any
evidence of over-emissions in the same vehicles sold within Europe.230
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The KBA most recently conducted post-market surveillance of VW ecodiesel vehicles only after the United States had already initiated enforcement
proceedings against VW for emissions cheating.231 This surveillance is rare—
most of these programs have fallen to the way-side in Germany and other
members of the EU.232 Again, leaving the KBA and Germany ill-equipped to
find any wrongdoing in the emergence of emission violations. The weak
communication between manufacturer and regulator in Germany effectively
nullifies the presence of a regulatory body—for an agency cannot regulate if it
does not have the necessary information for which to do so.
2. Enforcement Mechanisms Allowed Both the United States and
Consumers to Hold VW Accountable
Not only could the United States uncover the emissions cheating scandal,
but it could also effectively hold VW accountable by utilizing enforcement
mechanisms to reach a settlement agreement with the manufacturer.233 The
United States and the EPA have a variety of enforcement tools at their disposal,
such as filing claims for violating federal environmental law,234 initiating recalls
of the affected vehicles,235 and holding individual actors responsible for criminal
actions.236 Another enforcement mechanism lies with the consumers who can
form a class action to file complaints against manufacturers for false
advertising.237 These tools likely serve not only as a method of holding a
manufacturer liable for its violations but also as a deterrent to all other vehicle
manufacturers.238 It is high stakes to cheat on emissions in the United States—
not only can sales in the United States be stopped,239 but there are also set
penalties for violating the CAA.240 This creates an economic incentive to comply
with environmental law in the United States because the cost of getting caught
can outweigh any sort of benefits that cheating could provide.241
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In the VW matter, the EPA began by issuing a notice of violation to VW
alleging that the manufacturer had cheated on federal emissions tests and
threatened to withhold model year 16 approval unless VW cooperated.242 The
loss of sales even for one single model year in the United States is high and was
enough to pressure VW to not only cooperate, but to fully admit guilt for over
eleven million vehicles worldwide emitting far above threshold levels.243
Both the United States244 and U.S. consumers in class action lawsuits245 filed
suit against VW for the environmental and public health harms caused by the
additional nitrous oxide emitted by those vehicles as well as for leading
American consumers to purchase the faulty “eco-diesel” vehicles believing that
they were making a purchase that would emit less than other diesel vehicles on
the market.246 In a groundbreaking settlement, VW agreed to pay nearly $26
billion247 and to either buy-back or fix the vehicles owned by consumers in the
class action.248
In Germany, VW has yet to face any serious consequences for its violations
despite admitting guilt in the United States.249 So far, the only repercussions for
the manufacturer in Germany have been some investor-suits for the loss in stock
(an effect of the negative publicity for the scandal in the United States)250 and a
diesel summit in which some broad promises have been made to fix some of the
affected vehicles.251 This is because Germany does little in the way of
enforcement tools if a manufacturer has violated its emissions requirements.252
The EU does not require Member States, like Germany, to impose any set
penalties253 and in Germany, there are no class actions.254 Even if there were, it
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is unlikely that Germany or the KBA would pursue any sort of action against
VW because Germany depends so heavily on VW’s business.255
Even in the face of such a clear-cut case of emissions cheating, Germany
seems unwilling to act.256 This not only negatively affects the country and its
citizens that have purchased the vehicles at issue in the past,257 but also further
deepens the hole into which Germany has fallen in being an ineffective regulator
of vehicle emissions.258 Its reputation as a country overly-deferential to major
diesel manufacturers like VW will only continue to haunt it, especially as the
European Union takes a stance against its inactivity.259 This is a reputation that
the United States should not envy. The enforcement mechanisms in place serve
to effectively deter manufacturers in the future from cheating and causing further
environmental and public health harm from nitrous oxide. Preserving the already
effective vehicle emission regulations will continue to set the stage for the
United States to be a powerful actor in regulating air quality.
CONCLUSION
The threat to both human health and the environment from nitrous oxide
emissions from both the VW “eco-diesel” vehicles as well as possibly other
manufacturers is great and negative effects from the VW cheating scandal alone
are serious. It is in the United States’ best interest to continue to protect the
public health and safety by ensuring vehicle emissions stay within their
threshold limits. Germany’s lack of response to the emissions cheating scandal
serves as an example of a regulatory regime that the United States should not
strive to achieve.
Not only are German regulators unable to hold VW accountable, but German
consumers that have purchased the “eco-diesel” vehicles are left with little
remedy other than a small software fix. Meanwhile, American owners of the
same vehicles have received either a buy-back or a complete fix to their vehicles
and the United States has obtained a large settlement agreement with the
manufacturer. The United States has set the stage to not just hold VW
accountable, but to send a message to all other manufacturers of light-duty diesel
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vehicles to comply with United States vehicle emission regulations or else face
massive economic losses and the public ire.
While there is no shortage of problems in U.S. environmental law, vehicle
emissions regulations are not one of them. The United States should not seek out
the poor position that Germany and the KBA hold. Germany has become
completely deferential to its manufacturer because it must compete with other
EU Member States for manufacturer business. This leaves the KBA weak and
the German government unable to hold manufactures accountable without
harming its own economy.
It is unsurprising, then, that the United States has a far more effective
approach to regulating vehicle emissions and that it could be so successful in the
fallout of the VW emissions cheating scandal while the German regulators have
yet to act. The United States should continue its already effective approach to
regulating vehicle emissions and should serve as an example to Germany and
other Member States of the European Union of what a successful environmental
regulator looks like. And, rather than weakening the current system in place, the
United States should seek to improve other areas of environmental law to an
extent that they may be as well-regulated as vehicle emissions are currently.
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